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We read with great interest and appreciation the careful consideration and analysis by Ambagtsheer et 
al. of the most critical ethical objections to Global Kidney Exchange (GKE). Ambagtsheer et al. conclude 
that implementation of GKE is a means to increase access to transplantation ethically and effectively.1,2 
These conclusions by their European Society of Transplantation (ESOT) committee on Ethical, Legal and 
Psychological Aspects of Transplantation (ELPAT) represent a step forward toward a greater 
understanding and an open, honest debate about GKE.  Taken together with the strong endorsement of 
GKE by Minerva et al. in Lancet3 and the positive position statement of the American Society of 
Transplant Surgeons (ASTS)4, Ambagtsheer et al. successfully dispel previously raised doubts5-13 to which 
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One previous argument against GKE that Ambagtsheer et al (and Minerva et al3) reject is that the 
general populations of some involved countries are not in support of this construct.18,19 We have 
recently published new data to refute this argument as well. In surveys in Germany, Spain, United States 
(U.S.) and Philippines asking whether GKE should be legal, following a detailed description of GKE, 79%, 
74%, 87%, and 85% answered “legal” to the question “should this exchange be legal or illegal?”20
Ambagtsheer et al. posed several questions to which we respond below. 
As of February 2020, 16 international donors and recipients from the Philippines, Mexico, and Denmark 
participated in GKE and all enthusiastically support the concept. For these exchanges, international 
participating centers were chosen because the U.S.-based team had established relationships with 
trusted, well-trained transplant physicians at those centers. Participating U.S. centers evaluated and 
approved the financial and ethical aspects of the proposed exchanges. Six of the eight GKE recipients 
were identified by local physicians and presented to the Alliance for Paired Kidney Donation (APKD) for 
potential participation in GKE. Two patients directly contacted APKD. Five of the eight international 
patients transplanted through GKE were highly sensitized and had waited years in their respective 
countries without a match; however, they were matched within months by GKE which offered a 
different genetic diversity of HLA. We believe that any pair that wishes to participate in GKE should be 
able to if a match is found and the resultant exchanges and transplants are possible, considering medical 
suitability, logistics, and finances.
Pre-transplant evaluation was initially performed at the international transplant center and then 
confirmed at the center actually performing the transplant, seven in the U.S., and one in Antigua. In 
three instances, the expenses caused by longer stays in the U.S. than originally intended were financed 
by the APKD. The first three to six weeks of post-operative care were provided by the healthcare 
providers in the country where the transplant took place, after which all post-transplant care was 
managed by the healthcare partners in the patients’ country.
The APKD managed escrow funds in the U.S. and works with international physician partners to 
distribute the funds as needed. These physician partners purchased medications or paid for local 
hospital/laboratory/professional services and submit receipts to APKD accountants. International 
accounts were replenished in $5,000 increments as necessary. As an example, we reserved $50,000 for 
our first patient in the Philippines in January 2015, and for the first five years post-transplantation he 















This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved
were never dispersed directly to participating patients or donors. Our escrow accounts were modeled to 
pay for post-transplant medications and aftercare indefinitely, expecting an average graft survival of ten 
years with some patients requiring support for longer and some patients losing their kidney prior to ten 
years. Reserved funds for GKE aftercare were designed to provide transplant-specific healthcare; yet 
including comprehensive healthcare coverage would be even better if financially achievable. 
Nevertheless, as noted in Bozek et al., we believe that GKE will increase transplant activity in low and 
middle income countries (LMIC) by a net flow of financial resources from high income countries (HIC) to 
LMIC to pay for pre-transplant evaluation and post-transplant aftercare for patients who would not 
otherwise have had access to this resource.
Six of the eight GKE recipients required financial support (two full and four partial) to pay for evaluation, 
travel, transplantation, complication risk, follow-up medications, and aftercare for donor and recipient. 
Two participating pairs (one Danish and one Mexican) had private funds for the transplantation and 
government support to pay for aftercare. Thus, our actuarial analysis did not require APKD to reserve 
escrow funds for Mexican and Danish patients, in contrast to the three patients (all from the Philippines) 
where government support was absent. Even when working with patients in Denmark, where a single 
healthcare payer provides universal access to in-country healthcare for all citizens, financial barriers 
prevented access to transplantation through GKE. 
GKE has made possible transplantation for patients who face a variety of immunological, regulatory, and 
financial barriers, to the benefit of all participants. Interestingly enough, some critics, who raise no 
objections when GKE is used to help highly sensitized patients in LMIC with sufficient financial resources 
to use GKE without financial subsidy, object when similar mechanisms are deployed to benefit poor 
patients who require subsidization.6 We are glad that Ambagtsheer et al. agree that GKE should also be 
carefully constructed to help patients from LMIC overcome financial barriers that just as surely prevent 
access to transplantation. 
The 1,000 kidney exchange transplants accomplished per year in the U.S. are due in part to continued 
exploration of matching strategies, including non-simultaneous chains.21-29 GKE can be expected to 
benefit from continued exploration and refinement as well. 
Ambagtsheer et al. suggest international regulation and supervision, perhaps by the World Health 
Organization (WHO). Once a variety of GKE options have been explored so that standard practices begin 
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widely and wisely adopted. It is worth noting that we initially proposed WHO oversight5, and Italy’s 
WHO Executive Board representative formally introduced such a motion.30 However, the WHO also 
produced statements condemning GKE.12 And, as Ambagtsheer et al. note, the WHO’s longstanding 
policy that each country must develop self-sufficiency in transplantation has, unfortunately, the side 
effect of severely limiting the availability of transplants in LMICs.  Since one of the main motivations of 
GKE is to make transplantation more available in LMICs, WHO regulation and supervision of GKE would 
require that the organization revisit the ethics of GKE, ideally with an open discussion involving 
representatives of all the WHO countries interested in this procedure. In other words, we strongly wish 
for WHO involvement exactly for the values used by the WHO to define itself: “These values are inspired 
by the WHO vision of a world in which all peoples attain the highest possible level of health, and our 
mission to promote health, keep the world safe and serve the vulnerable, with measurable impact for 
people at country level. We are individually and collectively committed to put these values into 
practice.”31
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